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Abstract The purpose of the paper is to rethink the role of actuality in the branching
model of possibilities. We investigate the idea that the model should be enriched with
an additional factor—the so-called Thin Red Line—which is supposed to represent
the single possible course of events that gets actualized in time. We believe that this
idea was often misconceived which prompted some unfortunate reactions. On the one
hand, it suggested problematic semantic models of future tense and and on the other, it
provoked questionable lines of criticism. We reassess the debate and point to potential
pitfalls, focusing on the semantic dimension of the Thin Red Line theory. Our agenda
transcends the semantics, however. We conclude that semantic considerations do not
threaten the Thin Red Line theory and that the proper debate should be carried in the
domain of metaphysics.
Keywords Branching time · Thin Red Line · Future contingents · Actualism
The paper is structured as follows: In the first section, we motivate introduction of the
Thin Red Line (TRL) and explain how it may be applied for semantic purposes. In
the second, we outline the semantic objection raised against TRL theory by Belnap
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and Green (1994) according to which TRL theory treats temporal and modal operators
inadequately.We explain how the objectionmay be overturned by a simple postseman-
tic maneuver—to interpret a sentence used at the time and the history of the context.
The postsemantic move, which we ultimately recommend, appeals to the notion of the
history of the context (whichwe identifywith the actual history). In the third sectionwe
focus on a particular line of criticism of the simple postsemantics—the postsemantic
problem of Belnap et al. (2001). In the next three sections, we discuss two postse-
mantic responses to the problem—by MacFarlane (2003) and by Malpass and Wawer
(2012)—and outline some of their weak points. In the last section, we reassess and
undermine the postsemantic problem. We argue that it is underlined by metaphysical
assumptions alien to the TRL theory.When TRL is stated in its proper setting of modal
actualism, the postsemantic problem has no teeth and the simple theory introduced in
the second section turns out to be free of both semantic and postsemantic difficulties.
1 Why do we need the Thin Red Line?
The reasons supporting the TRL are twofold—metaphysical and semantic. Aswe shall
see, these two domains are closely connected and the theoretical choices made in one
domain usually affect the decisions made in another.
Let us explore metaphysics first. The branching model is meant to represent the
possible ways in which the world may develop (for detailed discussion of the model
and its significance see e.g., Belnap et al. 2001; Rumberg 2016; Wawer 2016). As
Aristotle noticed, the notion of possibility is intelligible only if contrasted with the
notion of actuality. Thus, the branching representation of possibilities is incomplete,
unless paired with a representation of actuality. This idea was concisely phrased by
Belnap et al. (2001):
“Sure, there are many things that might happen, but only one of them is what
really will happen. (Qué será, será.)” If one has objective leanings at all, it is
easy to feel a need to treat both conjuncts with equal objectivity. (Belnap et al.
2001, pp. 160–1)
Interestingly enough, Belnap et al. (2001) do not treat the second conjunct with
equal objectivity (we will return, and question, one of their reasons in due course).
Nonetheless, they describe a robust and solid intuition which we call the “actualistic
insight.” The historical roots of this idea can be found in medieval treatments of
future contingents by St. Anselm, William of Ockham, and Richard of Lavenham.
The intuition was incorporated into the branching setting with the idea that one of the
branches of the tree is the actual branch—the branch that represents what did, does,
and will happen. Prior opposed the view, but it was endorsed by, among the others,
Rescher and Urquhart (1971), McKim and Davis (1976) and Øhrstrøm (1981).
The second reason to evoke the Thin Red Line (TRL) is of semantic nature. The
TRL is meant to provide non-relative truth values to sentences regarding the future.
To explain the details, we need to outline the basics of Ockhamist semantics first.
Ockhamism was proposed by Arthur Prior (1966, 1967) and formally clarified by
Richmond Thomason (1970). The key feature of the semantics is that sentences are
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evaluated at pairs consisting of a possiblemomentm (a point on the tree of possibilities)
and a possible history h (a line through the tree containing the moment). For example,
– The sentence “It will be the case that φ” is true at m/h iff “φ” is true at some later
moment m′ in h;
m/h | Fφ iff ∃m′(m′ ∈ h & m′ > m & m′/h | φ) .
– The sentence “It is inevitable that φ” is true at a pair m/h if and only if “φ” is true
at every h′ passing through m;
m/h | φ iff ∀h′(m ∈ h′ ⇒ m/h′ | φ).
We should mention that the term “Ockhamism” and its variants are highly ambigu-
ous in the contemporary literature. In the more technically oriented pieces, it is usually
used to refer to the formal semantics initially proposed by Prior. Quite often, however,
it is used to indicate the general idea that sentences regarding the contingent future
may be true (see, e.g. Rosenkranz 2012; Iacona 2014). These two need not go hand
in hand. For example, Belnap et al. (2001) endorse Ockhamism in the first sense,
while they reject it in the second. Adding to the confusion, Peter Øhrstrøm argues
that Prior’s Ockhamism does not embody the spirit of William of Ockham’s philoso-
phy and he distinguishes between “Ockhamistic” and “Ockham” semantics (Øhrstrøm
2016, sec. 5).
The term TRL-semantics might also be confusing. It might refer to a specific formal
semantic project, competing with Prior’s Ockhamism, that incorporates a representa-
tion of the Thin Red Line to define future tense in the branchingmodels (e.g., Øhrstrøm
2009, defends TRL-semantics in this sense). It might also refer to the general idea that
we should somehow appeal to the metaphysical notion of the Thin Red Line when
assessing future contingents. The second sense of “TRL-semantics” is similar to the
second sense of “Ockhamism” mentioned above. In this paper, we will use the term
“Ockhamism”, and “Ockhamist semantics”, in its original sense—to refer to the formal
semantics defined on the branching models by Arthur Prior, and outlined above. The
term “TRL-semantics” (also “trl f cn-semantics) will be used to designate the formal
projects akin to Øhrstrøm’s. To avoid further confusion, we decided to coin a com-
pletely new term—“futurism”—to name our own proposal. It might be seen (spoiler
alert!) as a version of TRL-semantics, in the second sense, based on Ockhamism, in
the first sense.
The Ockhamist semantics has stood the test of time and it is still endorsed by many
theorists using the branching model. It owes a lot of its success to the composite
nature of the semantic index. Firstly, since it consists of a moment/history pair, it
admits natural and independent definitions of temporal and modal operators (the first
shifts themoment of the index and the second the history of the index). Secondly, since
histories are composed of moments, the dual index allows for a smooth interaction of
modal and temporal operators. The source of success of Ockhamism, however, has
also become its major curse.
It was clear early on that Ockhamism generates certain controversy (the problem
is described as early as in Thomason 1970). If we try to interpret a sentence used at a
particular moment, the semantic machinery requires that we pick a particular history,
but there seems to be no reason to privilege one history passing through a moment
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over another. Therefore, the extension of an expression regarding the future is relative
to a completely arbitrary choice of the history parameter of the index.
The standard answer to this problem in the framework of intensional semantics (see
e.g. Kaplan 1989) is to postulate that the context of the utterance provides (or, as we
shall say, initializes) the relevant semantic index (the moment and the history in our
case).1 The typical procedure has been questioned, however, in the branching setting
(see in particular Belnap et al. 2001; MacFarlane 2003, 2014). It has been argued that
in face of indeterminism, the context of utterance does not initialize a single possible
history as the history of the context. If it does not, however, we encounter a problem
of initialization failure: if we want to use Ockhamism, we need to begin the process
of interpretation at a particular semantic index, but no such index is initialized by the
context of utterance.
To address the problem, John MacFarlane (2003) introduced an intermediate level
of linguistic analysis which he calls postsemantics. Its role is to dictate how to use
Ockhamism to assess a sentence used at a context.2 More generally, the role of postse-
mantics is to systematically relate the everyday notion of truth of a sentence used at a
context (whichwe symbolically encode as ||−) to amore technical notion ofOckhamist
truth of a sentence at a semantic index (which we symbolize by |).
This brings us to the second, more technical source of motivation for the TRL.
Given that only one of the histories is the actual history, it is evident that it is the
history that should be used for semantic purposes. Actuality breaks the tie among the
possible histories. Thus, thanks to the actualistic insight encoded by TRL, we can
respond to the initialization failure and return to the “flat” postsemantics advocated
by David Kaplan and simply evaluate an expression used at a context at the (present)
moment and the (actual) history of the context.
Although this idea might seem as the most natural way to tackle the initialization
failure, it has been treated with considerable distrust. It was argued that introduction of
the TRL generates considerable formal obstacles that disqualify this semantic theory.
Wedonot believe that future looks sodim for theTRL, but let usfirst briefly recapitulate
those worries.
2 Semantic objection to TRL
Themost straightforward application of the actualistic insight into the branchingmodel
binds the semantic interpretation of the future tense operator F to the T RL .
1 The context need not be identified with one of the semantic indexes, like a moment/history pair. It also
need not be equated with a moment at a tree, as is sometimes done in the branching setting (see, e.g. Belnap
et al. 2001, ch. 8).We carefully separate contexts from indexes to avoid any unnecessary confusion.We tend
to think, in line with Kaplan, that a context is a representation of a concrete situation at which an utterance is
made, while histories and moments serve as auxiliary formal parameters needed for interpretation of modal
and temporal operators. They represent possibilities and temporal elements thereof.
2 MacFarlane (2014 ch. 9) describes several postsemantic strategies available in the branching setting,
including TRL, Peirceanism, three-valued semantics, supervaluationism, and his own relativism (the list is
extended in chapter 4 of Wawer 2016).
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Definition 1 The sentence “It will be the case that φ” is true at moment m iff the
sentence “φ” is true at later moment m′, on the T RL;
m|TRLFφ iff ∃m′(m′ > m & m′ ∈ T RL & m′|TRLφ).
At first sight, it is exactly what we wanted to achieve. The truth value of a sentence
in the future tense is not relative to themodal parameter (the history parameter); rather,
it depends solely on what will actually happen. Thanks to existence of the TRL, we
do not need to semantically relativize the truth value of a sentence to a history. So, we
do not need to initialize the history parameter and the initialization failure does not
arise.
This theory is faulty, however, on the semantic level. The difficulty was realized
already by Richmond Thomason (1970, pp. 270–271) who, having briefly considered
a version of TRL semantics, made the following comment:
Suppose that β is in the real future of α; then
what of the point γ ? It isn’t in real time, and
yet in order to evaluate tensed formulas at γ we






The worry is that since “real time” is missing at somemoments of the tree, it is hard
to analyze operator F at such moments. At first, the objection might seem artificial.
After all, why should we ever need to evaluate tensed formulas at points which are not
in the real time? The answer is that in a compositional semantics, the future operator
might be embedded in scope of modal operators which shift the point of evaluation
outside of the TRL. This process is well illustrated by the example studied by Belnap
and Green:
The coin will come up heads. It is possible, though, that it will come up tails, and
then later (*) it will come up tails again (though at that moment it could come
up heads), and then, inevitably, still later it will come up tails yet again.
The trouble is that at (*) the example says that tails will happen, not merely that
it might, whereas the explanation of the future tense given above presupposed
that the moment of evaluation was in the TRL. (Belnap and Green 1994, p. 379)
To avoid this difficulty, most proponents of the TRL followed Thomason’s impera-
tive that “wemust provide γ a real future” and postulated “real futures” of themoments
outside of the actual course of events (see e.g. McKim and Davis 1976; Barcellan and
Zanardo 1999; Øhrstrøm 2009). We think of this as a turn away from Ockhamism
and towards ’Molinism’. This decision marks an important shift in the approach to
the TRL. In face of the semantic difficulties, the TRLers abandon the natural idea
of the Absolute Thin Red Line according to which exactly one of the possibilities is
being actualized in the course of time and move to a metaphysically more contentious
notion of a Functional Thin Red Line which implies that even non-actual moments
have (quasi)actual futures. Formally, the technique is very simple, we just replace
single TRL with a TRL-function trl f cn : M → Hist such that ∀mm ∈ trl f cn(m).
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Fig. 1 The thick lines indicate
the actual branches of the tree
Intuitively, trl f cn(m) is meant to designate the history that is actual at moment m.
With trl f cn at hand, we can interpret the future operator at any moment of the tree:
Definition 2 The sentence “It will be the case that φ” is true at moment m iff the
sentence “φ” is true at later moment m′, in the trl f cn(m);
m|f-trlFφ iff ∃m′(m′ > m & m′ ∈ trl f cn(m) & m′|f-trlφ).
Introduction of trl f cn allows for a more appealing formal system, but it forces the
TRLers to sacrifice part of their conceptual chastity. When they initially incorporated
the notion of the actual course of events into the branching setting, they explicitly
argued that there is just one possible course of events which gets actualized as time
goes by. The actualist intuition supports this verdict. However, in face of the formal
problem explicated by Belnap and Green, they gave up this assumption and consented
to the central idea of Molinism; i.e. that each moment in the branching world has
its own actual future. This idea can be pictorially represented by the tree depicted in
Fig. 1.
In such amodel, we use the real future to interpret the future tense, but if it ismissing
we can always use the “second grade” real futures. The future that is not “really”
real, but somehow more real than the alternatives. We sympathize with Thomason’s
comments on this idea:
At this point we begin to lose track of what a “real future” is, and plainly it would
be better to just return to a linear conception of time. (Thomason 1970, p. 271)
In fact, it is exactly what we recommend as a promising path for the TRL theory
(see Sect. 7), especially that trl f cn has proven to be problematic not only on the
conceptual, but also on the formal level. It turned out that although the functional
semantics of the future tense does provide an interpretation of the future tense at an
arbitrary moment of the tree, the interaction of the future operator with other tense and
modal connectives is highly problematic. Numerous fixes were proposed, but none
seem entirely satisfactory (see Wawer 2014, section 2, for a detailed exposition and
criticism of trl f cn semantics).
We suggest, therefore, that TRL should not be incorporated on the semantic level
(e.g. to interpret operator F), but that it should be used postsemantically, as a tool
linking the truth at contextwith the truth at index. Itmeans that TRLshould be exploited
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Fig. 2 Moment mc is the
moment of the context, it is a
part of the history of the context
(the TRL). History h1 branches
off the TRL at moment m0,
before moment mc . At moment
m2 following moments m0 and
m1 in history h1, it is sunny
to provide the history of the context, and thus to address the initialization failure, but
having accomplished this goal, it should leave the stage. While the relevant history is
initialized, the semantic computation should proceed along the standard Ockhamist
rules. You can phrase this idea in form of a “flat” postsemantic definition:
Definition 3 (Futurism) The sentence “φ” is true at context c iff φ is true at the
moment of the context mc (the present moment) and the history of the context hc (the
actual history).
c  φ iff mc/hc  φ
Using this strategy, we can stick to the intuitive Ockhamist semantics and also hold
on to the simple linear conception of time (there is only one history actualized in
time). Therefore, we can avoid both conceptual and technical problems of the trl f cn-
semantics. A very similar proposal, though expressed using different vocabulary, was
recently entertained by Andrea Iacona (2014). We discuss his ideas in Sect. 6 and 7,
and ultimately recommend (our interpretation of) his proposal as a viable version of
the TRL theory.
Te get a better grip on the idea, let us test it with a version of the example
discussed by Belnap and Green (using the model represented in Fig. 2). Consider
the sentence “It might have been the case that it would be sunny” encoded by
P♦FF(sunny), used at context c. Under the postsemantics introduced above, c ||−
P♦FF(sunny) iff mc/hc | P♦FF(sunny). Thus, a sentence is simply true at a
given context if it is Ockhamist-true at the current moment, with respect to the actual
history. Then, we proceed with the standard Ockhamist computations. For example,
mc/hc | P♦FF(sunny) iff there is an earlier moment (like m0) such that there is
a history passing through that moment (like h1), such that there is a later moment in
this history (like m1) at which F(sunny) is true with respect to that history. Observe
that the semantic problem of Belnap and Green does not arise at this point, since we
do not need the TRL to interpret the future-tensed sentence F(sunny) at the changed
semantic index m1/h1. We use the ordinary Ockhamist rule and evaluate sentence
F(sunny)with respect to history h1 which has been introduced by the modal operator
♦ at moment m0. Therefore, the problem of interpreting the future operator outside
of the history of the context (the actual history) does not arise, and we can easily
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Fig. 3 The sentence P♦F(toss ∧ F(heads)) is uttered at a context in TRL. At an earlier moment, a
possibility branches off the TRL which later splits into two histories, one where the coin lands heads and
the other where it lands tails. The sentence F(heads) is uttered at the non-actual context, just before the
tails-history and the heads-history split
compute that the sentence “It might have been the case that it would be sunny” is true
at context c.
3 Postsemantic objection to TRL
This line of thought must have been intuited by the critics of TRL, since their “formal”
complaint is considerably different in (Belnap et al. 2001) than it is in (Belnap and
Green 1994):
The TRL theory sounds all right, but it is not. It has the “logical” defect that it
gives no account whatsoever of predictive speech acts occurring at moments of
use that lie off the TRL and is by so much useless. (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 162)
The authors are no longer interested, at least not directly, in the analysis of an
embedded future tense operator. Instead, they focus on speech acts which happen to
occur at contexts that lie outside of the actual course of events. This is a subtle, but
important difference. They are asking a paradigmatically postsemantic question in the
sense of (MacFarlane 2003)—how to use semantic machinery to analyze speech acts
that happen not to take place on the TRL?
To illustrate the difference between the semantic and postsemantic objections, let
us have a look at the model depicted in Fig. 3 and consider the sentence:
It was possible that the coin would be tossed and it would land heads.
(P♦F(toss ∧ F(heads)))
The properly semantic problem regards interpreting the sentence P♦F(toss ∧
F(heads)) used at an actual context, with attention focused on the underlined occur-
rence of operator F . The worry is that when the first three operators P♦F shift the
semantic index to a non-actual moment and a non-actual history, the embedded sen-
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tence F(heads) will end up false or meaningless at the new index. The postsemantic
question concerns assessment of the sentence F(heads) used at the non-actual context
when the coin is being tossed. The picture above clearly illustrates that these are two
distinct problems. On the one hand, the sentence P♦F(toss∧ F(heads)) is evidently
true, as used at the actual context. On the other hand, it is entirely unclear, if we should
call the sentence F(heads) true, while used at the non-actual context.3
To put things differently, it is a distinct matter to answer whether it is true that φ
is possible than to answer whether φ true, when used in a possible context. We are by
no means the first ones to raise the distinction. The locus classicus is (Evans 1985),
where a particular semantic theory of temporal logic, which is called T3, is contrasted
with the standard semantics of modal logic:
The semantic value a complex tensed sentence possesses in a context is, accord-
ing to T3, a function of the semantic value which the embedded sentence would
possess in another context; this is not true of the semantic values of complex
statements of a modal logic, or indeed of any other known logic. (Evans 1985,
p. 361, emphasis ours)
Evans stresses here that the standard semantics of modal operators does not require
evaluation of embedded sentences in non-actual contexts, it is enough to shift a rele-
vant parameter of the semantic index. The message for the current discussion is that it
is possible to answer Belnap and Green’s semantic objection without answering Bel-
nap et al.’s (2001) postsemantic objection. In the end, it is precisely the strategy we
recommend. Nonetheless, there were at least two attempts to address the postsemantic
challenge directly. Let us present them briefly to learn from their struggle.
4 TRL-function postsemantics
The postsemantic challenge was first addressed by JohnMacFarlane (2003). In fact, he
was the first to clearly distinguish the semantic and postsemantic dimension of Belnap
et al.’s (2001) objections (the first concerns the proper semantic definitions of logical
connectives—i.e. the truth at an index—while the second regards the relationship
between truth at context and at index). MacFarlane agreed with Belnap et al. (2001)
that the absolute TRL is not a promising outset for the accurate postsemantic theory,
since the actual history is not available at a non-actual context. He noticed, however,
that one can use trl f cn in a non-standard manner: to postsemantically initialize the
history of evaluation at a context rather than to semantically interpret the future tense
operator.
3 There is still another problem in the vicinity: how to interpret an actually used sentence like “Jack could
have truly said ‘The coin will land heads.’ ”? We believe that it should be understood more or less as “It
could have been that: Jack says ‘The coin will land heads’ and the coin later lands heads,” which is easily
interpreted without shifting the context. For discussion of formal details and subtle intricacies of this idea,
see (Wawer 2016, sec. 6.3.6)
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Definition 4 The sentence “φ” is true at context c iff it is true at the moment of the
context mc and history trl f cn(mc).
c||−f-trlφ iff mc/trl f cn(mc) | φ
The definition kills two birds with one stone. First, it answers the postsemantic chal-
lenge (i.e. it accounts for prediction made at arbitrary contexts). And second, it avoids
the the typical semantic problems of TRL theories:
This proposal is not touched by Belnap and Green’s semantic arguments against
the use of a thin red line (Facing the Future, pp. 160–170). It uses the very same
semantics proper as Belnap and Green endorse, and appeals to the thin red line
only in the postsemantics. (MacFarlane 2003, p. 330, n. 10)
The lesson from MacFarlane is that we do not need to modify the standard Ock-
hamist semantics to subscribe to TRL theory. In particular, the semantics of the future
tense operator can remain history dependent, but thanks to trl f cn postsemantics, this
feature does not generate the initialization failure.When the sentence is used at context
c, we begin the process of evaluation atmc/trl f cn(mc). Then, we systematically apply
the standard Ockhamist rules in semantic analysis. Due to this simple maneuver, we
can leave behind, at a single stroke, all the purely semantic problems of TRL-theory.
MacFarlane’s postsemantic proposal has been appreciated by Øhrstrøm, the major
champions of the semantic version of theThinRedLine (seeØhrstrømandHasle 2015,
sec. 5.3). Nonetheless, MacFarlane himself rejected trl f cn theory for postsemantic
reasons. In his view, it improperly models counterfactual retrospective assessments of
future contingent claims (see MacFarlane 2014, pp. 209–211). Instead of discussing
the details of MacFarlane’s objection let us quickly examine our own earlier theory
(Malpass and Wawer 2012), which also addressed the postsemantic challenge.
5 Supervaluational Thin Red Line
Malpass andWawer, our previous selves, firmly rejected the idea of “alternative actual
futures,” i.e., actual futures of merely possible moments, that was incorporated into
functional TRL theory.We argued that there should be one, and only one, actual course
of events in the entire branching model—the unique possible course of events that gets
actualized in the course of time.
Aware of the postsemantic objection against the TRL, we nonetheless tried to
account for predictions made at non-actual moments. We came up with a kind of
patchwork theory of predictions. In simple terms, their idea was that:
– A prediction that is actually made is true iff what it says will actually happen.
– A prediction that could have been made is true iff it would have been true, if it had
been made.
We later argued that the question about what will happen is entirely different from
the question about what would happen since the first, but not the second, is settled by
the flow of time. Since there is no comparable metaphysical factor to settle contingent
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counterfactuals, all we can do is to appeal to the modal dimension and consider what
would possibly, inevitably, or probably happen in non-actual circumstances. Very
similar observation was previously made by Robert Adams:
The categorical predictions involved in simple foreknowledge may be true by
corresponding to future events (…). But in the case of counterfactuals of freedom
that are about non-actual creatures or have false consequents, the conditionally
predicted actions are not there to be corresponded with because they never actu-
ally occur. The truth of counterfactuals is commonly grounded in a logical or
causal necessitation of the consequent by the antecedent. (Adams 1991, p. 345)
Malpass and Wawer expressed the difference in postsemantic terms. In their view,
actual predictions of contingent events are either true of false, while non-actual predic-
tions of contingent events are neither true nor false. To formally express the difference,
they designed a theory which they called Supervaluational Thin Red Line (STRL). It is
“Supervaluational,” since it incorporates elements of supervaluationism at non-actual
contexts and it is “Thin Red Line,” since it stresses the special status of the actual
predictions. Remember that in supervaluationism:
Definition 5 The sentence “φ” is true at context c iff it is true at the moment of the
context mc and at all histories passing through mc. (Thomason 1970)
c||−supφ iff ∀h(mc ∈ h ⇒ mc/h | φ).
In contrast, in STRL theory the truth value of a prediction at a moment is “sensitive”
to the existence of the TRL. If a prediction is made at an actual moment, STRL it
behaves as any standard TRL theory and attaches the truth value of the prediction
to what will actually happen. If it is made at a non-actual moment, its truth value
depends on what is possible and necessary at the non-actual moment, just as it does in
supervaluationism. Our idea can be encoded by the following postsemantic definition:
Definition 6 The sentence “φ” is true at context c iff it is true at the moment of the
context mc and at TRL, or at all histories passing through mc.
c||−strlφ iff (mc/T RL | φ or ∀h(mc ∈ h ⇒ mc/h | φ)
)
.
This way, we answered the worry that the “TRL theory (…) gives no account what-
soever of predictive speech acts occurring at moments of use that lie off the TRL”
(Belnap et al. 2001, p. 162).
6 Iacona’s objections
The STRL theory prompted a critical response by Andrea Iacona (2014). According
to Iacona, the most problematic feature of STRL theory is that it presupposes a notion
of a model where one, and only one, of the histories is distinguished as the actual
history (TRL). His criticism is encapsulated in the following comment:
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Such a semantics seems incapable of making sense of the counterfactual hypoth-
esis that one of the courses of events that include a given non-actual moment is
the actual course of events. (Iacona 2014, p. 2642).
One might wonder why Iacona wants to make a hypothesis that a course of events
which contains a non-actual moment is the actual course of events. His rationale is the
following:
If the actual history is fixed once and for all in the model, it turns out that
sentences lose some basic semantic properties when they are evaluated at non-
actual moments. However, there is a sense in which one may expect that all
moments are alike with respect to those properties, namely, the sense in which
every moment is actual from its own point of view. (Iacona 2014, p. 2641)
Thus, Iacona rephrases Belnap and Green’s semantic objection and insists (rightly,
we believe) that the semantic properties of linguistic expression should not be sensitive
to the TRL, i.e. the meaning of the language should not differ in actual and non-
actual circumstances. He observes, though, that according to STRL some moments
are distinguished as absolutely actual and argues that the distinction later affects the
semantic features of various expressions.
We believe that the problem can be averted, if one recognizes semantic and postse-
mantic dimension of STRL theory.4 As far as semantics is concerned, STRL satisfies
Iacona’s requirement that every semantic index has “equal rights” and that interpreta-
tion of linguistic expressions does not depend on whether they are evaluated in actual
circumstances. Malpass and Wawer, just as MacFarlane, accept ordinary Ockhamism
and utilize the Thin Red Line in postsemantics only. Therefore, their theory does not
fall pray to the semantic objections (unless those are objections undermining Ock-
hamist semantics in general).
Let us exemplify the general point and study one specific worry raised by Iacona.
He writes that in STRL theory
∨ is truth-functional at actual moments and non-truth-functional at non-actual
moments. (Iacona 2014, p. 2640)
From this, he concludes that that “the meaning of a logical constant varies with
the moment of evaluation” (Iacona 2014, p. 2640) which is clearly unacceptable.5
This conclusion is not warranted, however, since the meaning of a sentential con-
4 We should be clear that in our previous paper we did not make the distinction between semantics and
postsemantics that we stress in this one.We also gave the reader ample reason for alternative interpretations.
For example, we referred both to moments and to moment/history pairs as “points of evaluation” which
might suggest, and indeed suggested to Andrea Iacona, that we were interested merely in properly semantic
considerations. Nonetheless, given that our overarching purpose was to address the postsemantic challenge
of Belnap et al. (2001), we charitably assume that STRL should be interpreted as a postsemantic theory.
5 Interestingly, Malpass and Wawer explicitly agree with Iacona’s judgment. In the more technical part of
their paper, they reject a theory that require distinct semantic treatment of a truth operator at actual and
non-actual moments. With regard to such theory they write: “the meaning of the language seems to change
from one point to another. (…) This is an idea which we feel reluctant to accept” (Malpass and Wawer
2012, p. 138).
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nective should be characterized by the pattern of its truth values at possible indexes,
not at possible contexts [as Evans advised in the mentioned text; a similar point is
made by David Lewis (1970) and David Kaplan (1989)]. Since Malpass and Wawer
accept Ockhamist truth, they also subscribe to a thoroughly truth-conditional notion
of disjunction—the truth value of a disjunction at an index is a function of the truth
values of the disjuncts at the index. The principal goal of any postsemantic theory is
not to specify the meaning of linguistic expressions, but to explain how to assess a
sentence used at a particular context. STRL assumes that the procedure is different
at actual and non-actual contexts, but it does not affect the semantic properties of the
language.
Thus, STRL may be defended against the Iacona’s objection. It does not mean,
however, that the theory is free of charges. The aspect of STRL which we find most
peculiar today is the idea of assessment of a sentence used at a non-actual context. It
seems most natural to extend the democracy advocated by Iacona from the semantic
to the postsemantic level and agree that whenever one considers a sentence used in
a given context, one should assume that the context is actual. Theoretical parsimony
recommends a uniform postsemantic treatment to be applied to all contexts, while
Malpass andWawer insist to treat some contexts as actual and others as as non-actual.6
To be fair to our former sleves, we should note that their persistent struggle to
interpret sentences used at non-actual contexts is not accidental. They explained that
the major purpose of their project was to answer the postsemantic challenge of Belnap
et al. (2001) and to give some account of “predictive speech acts occurring at moments
of use that lie off the TRL” (Belnap et al. 2001, p. 162, emphasis ours).Whoever aims to
address the challenge cannot treat an arbitrary context as if it was actual. For this reason
Malpass and Wawer and MacFarlane introduce postsemantic theories that explicitly
dictate how to assess sentences used at non-actual contexts. We believe that it is also
why they ultimately fail.
7 Postsemantic challenge reassessed
Therefore, rather than offering yet another postsemantic TRL theory, we decided to
challenge the postsemantic challenge of Belnap et al. (2001). We believe that it is
based on a tacit metaphysical assumption which should be rejected by any proponent
of TRL theory. To use Wittgenstein’s metaphor, an attempt to interpret sentences used
at non-actual contexts
commits us to a particular way of looking at the matter. (…) The decisive move-
ment in the conjuring trick has been made, and it was the very one that we
thought quite innocent. (Wittgenstein, Philosophical Investigations, §308.)
6 We seem to have packed two independent insights into a single project: (i) that every future contingent, like
“The coin will land heads,” is either true or false at a context and (ii) that none actually used counterfactual
with a contingent consequent, like “Had I tossed the coin, it would have landed heads,” can be assigned a
truth value at a context. An attempt to formally grasp the second insight is sketched in (Wawer andWroński
2015).
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The original sin of Malpass and Wawer (and MacFarlane) was to accept Belnap’s
postsemantic challenge at all. What should have immediately raised our eyebrows, but
did not, is the presupposition of the challenge. Namely, Belnap et al. (2001) assume
that there are people, who live outside of the actual world and who make their own
predictions. It might be reasonable within the modal metaphysics accepted by Belnap
et al. (2001), but TRL theory is motivated by the actualist insight which rejects such
a picture. It should be clear to any TRLer that as soon as one considers a person
making a prediction, one needs to assume that the person occupies the actual world.
Otherwise, one gives up the actualist credentials and implicitly accept the modal-
realistic perspective on the tree of possibilities. One lets into the world plenty of
people who live in non-actual possibilities and who make predictions of their own that
need to be taken care off.
The postsemantic objection is symptomatic of the entire line of criticism of the TRL
raised by Belnap et al. (2001, see in particular sec. 6D). It reveals the metaphysical
underpinning of their account of the branching model (the authors, however, would
probably distance themselves from accusation of being involved in any sort of meta-
physics). Almost all branching theorists agree that the model is meant to represent the
possible courses of events, but Belnap et al. seem to buy into a particular brand of
modal metaphysics—the brand associated with the modal realism of David Lewis.7
In particular, they accept what might be called “modal neutrality”. According to this
view, no point in a modal space can be privileged as objectively and absolutely actual.
They consider actuality as indexical and perspectival. Every possible world (possible
moment) is actual from its own perspective and none such perspective is distinguished
as the correct one. Their devotion to the idea of modal neutrality is quite well captured
by the claim that their “theory of agents and choices in branching time pictures the
causal structure of our world as made up of alternative courses of events branching
tree-like toward the future” (Belnap et al. 2001, p. v, emphasis ours).
The principle of modal neutrality is hard to reconcile with the notion of the abso-
lutely actual branch—the TRL. As soon as we accept that every modal perspective is
on a par with our own perspective, it is hard to simultaneously admit that only one of
the possibilities is absolutely different from all the others (i.e. not merely relatively or
indexically actual). The tension is exploited in Belnap et al.’s arguments against the
TRL. The postsemantic objection is a good example. Modal neutrality requires that
all the speakers in the branching worlds are actual to themselves, but absolute actual-
ity demands that only some of them are objectively actual. Therefore, some unlucky
speakers, who consider themselves actual, are not really actual and do not have the
TRL at their disposal and hence, they cannot use it for (post)semantic purposes. This,
and other of their objections, leads to a conclusion which can be put shortly: if Our
World is branching, then we cannot distinguish just one branch as absolutely actual.
7 There certainly are some significant differences: see Lewis (1986), sec. 4.2, for his criticismof overlapping
worlds; see also Belnap et al. (2001), sec. 7A.6, for their criticism of Lewisian worlds. Nonetheless, they
seem to share certain core principles. Belnap has probably inherited a realist account of branching from
Richmond Thomason who sympathizes with Lewis’ account of modality (see for example Thomason 1984,
p. 215, n. 14); Belnap et al. themselves also draw some parallels between their, and Lewis’ vision ofmodality
(see Belnap et al. 2001, p. 163).
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Fig. 4 On the left-hand side, the tree of possibilities is depicted. The unique possibility successively
actualized by the world is represented by the thick, densely dashed history. On the right-hand side, the
linearly developing world itself is depicted. The coin happens to land tails in the world, so the actualized
possibility needs to represent the coin as landing tails
As they say, one philosopher’smodus ponens is another’smodus tollens. We accept
the implication mentioned above, but we derive the opposite conclusion. Since we
accept an absolute distinction between the actual and the possible, we abandon the idea
that our world is branching. We deny the principle of modal neutrality and accept that
the perspective of just one possibility—our possibility—offers the accurate account of
reality. The pictorial representation of theTRL theory presented above, in Sect. 2 and 3,
is therefore slightly misleading. A more appropriate diagram clearly distinguishes the
(linearly developing) worldwhere utterances take place from the sphere of (branching)
possibilities. The latter are necessary to analyzeactually used sentences regardingwhat
might have happened, but they should not be confused with the world itself.8 Look at
Fig. 4 for a more accurate representation.
Thus, to properly counter the postsemantic challenge, one should insist that there
are no people who happen to live in merely possible circumstances and who perform
speech acts that “lie off the TRL.” Therefore, there is nothing to give an account of and
the challenge never gets off the ground. It means that when Belnap et al. (2001, p. 162)
complain that “the TRL (…) gives no account whatsoever of predictive speech acts
occurring at moments of use that lie off the TRL” one should not be much concerned.
It is not a “logical defect,” as they describe it, but it is the most reasonable consequence
of the actualist worldview. The best way to address Belnap et al.’s (2001) postsemantic
worry, is not to worry about it at all.
Our cautious attitude towards the branching model is faithful to Arthur Prior’s
legacy.Theproponent of themodelwas rather scarce on itsmetaphysical interpretation,
but there is good reason to believe that he also would not treat the branching tree
as a depiction of the structure of the world itself. Remember that Prior contributed
enormously to invention and development of relational models of modal and tense
8 The metaphysical status of branching possibilities is a whole new subject which we do not intend to
tackle here. Importantly though, even if an actualist accepts that possibilities are real, they insist that they
are differently real than the concrete world we occupy.
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logic, but he was very skeptical throughout his career about their philosophical gravity.
In 1958, when he comments on an interpretation of a system of tense logic (PF-
calculus) in terms of first-order logic (1-calculus), he notes:
The interpretation of the PF-calculus within the 1-calculus is clearly a device of
considerable metalogical utility. (…)
There are strong reasons, however, for refusing to attach this metaphysical sig-
nificance to the interpretability of the PF-calculus in the 1-calculus. (Prior 1958,
pp. 115–116)
He reaffirms the same attitude with respect to modal logic in his posthumously
published book.
So, the original, normal or standard interpretation of the calculus sketched in 1.1
[a version of themodal system S5], i.e., the interpretation of it as a logic of neces-
sity and possibility, can be presented as just a special case of the interpretation of
it as a mildly odd formulation of the uniform monadic lower predicate calculus.
It can be so presented. But do we illuminate the subject of modal logic by so
presenting it? To this I want to say, No; or at all events, Not much. (…) [P]ossible
worlds, in the sense of possible states of affairs, are not really individuals (just
as numbers are not really individuals). To say that a state of affairs obtains is
just to say that something is the case; to say that something is a possible state of
affairs is just to say that something could be the case. (Prior and Fine 1977, pp.
53–54)
Hence, even though Prior was sometimes interpreted as an advocate of branching
of time (see e.g., Thomason 1970; Rescher and Urquhart 1971), he would likely
agree with us that a branching model is just a useful set theoretical and diagrammatic
representation of more primitive modal facts regarding what might have been the case.
Drawing trees is a convenient way of representing temporal possibilities on a piece of
paper, but we should keep in mind that suggestive drawings are potentially dangerous
in the philosophical practice. The treemight help us to conceptualize relations between
time and modality, but it should not mislead us to thinking that there is a multitude of
branches “out there” occupied by the “tree-dwellers” similar to us.9
Our project is particularly keen to Prior’s demand not to reifymodality and to accept
the fundamental distinction between the possible and the actual. With respect to the
temporal domain, we try not to prejudge whether the notions of past, present, and
future deserve a similar, fundamental status. Thus, we are less committed than Prior to
presentism andA-theory. In fact, we believe that TRL theory as such is compatiblewith
a variety of views in metaphysics of time, ranging from presentism, through growing
block and moving-spotlight, to eternalism. For us, the rejection of modal realism is
the distinctive move here, and this can be combined with any of the standard temporal
ontologies to produce a version of TRL theory. Prior was also rather skeptical with
regard to the notion of “true future” among all the possible ones, as he believed that
9 A similar conjecture regarding Prior’s skeptical attitude to reification of the branching model is made in
(Hasle and Øhrstrøm 2016, p. 3411).
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the notion has deterministic overtones (see Prior 2003). In this respect, we also part
ways with the great New Zealander.
7.1 Elitist and egalitarian TRL
Webelieve that instead of fighting the postsemantic objection an actualist should ignore
it and insist that every context is a part of the TRL. There are two ways to look at the
thesis—“elitist” and “egalitarian”. The elitist assumes the perspective of the actual
history and stubbornly insist that no moment outside of the TRL can be reasonably
conceived as the moment of the context. Such an approach was once chosen by one
of us (Wawer 2014). The author argues that since there are no other worlds, “parallel”
or “branched,” in which people make (true or false) assertions, no moment outside of
TRL can be reasonably treated as themoment of the context and thus, the postsemantic
problem does not arise.
Such an actualist obviously admits that some assertionswhich have never beenmade
might have been made. For example, they readily admit that Elizabeth Warren might
have said “I fully endorse Bernie Sanders” during the 2016 Democratic primaries in
the US. They might even admit that there is a possible moment and a possible history
in which the assertion is being made. They keep in mind, however, that such a claim
is not to be taken completely literally. It is a useful paraphrase that capture a more
fundamental truth about the modal reality. The sentence paraphrased depends on the
particular version of actualism, but the claim that there is a possible scenario in which
Elizabeth Warren utters “A” might be understood as:
– Elizabeth Warren could have said “A”.
– E.W. had a disposition/power/tendency to say “A”.
– There is an (abstract) maximally compatible set of propositions representing E.W.
as saying “A”.
– There is an (abstract) maximal state of affairs in which E.W. says “A”.
– There is a way things could have been containing E.W. saying “A”.
– Etc.
As far as the TRL theory advocated in this paper goes, any of these suggested
metaphysical pictures would be acceptable. However, we currently find the second
option to be quite promising, and the sort of thing we naturally have in mind when
we think of the TRL. The idea is that the possible futures in the branching tree are
reducible to more fundamental facts about the powers or dispositions of actually
existing entities. So imagine that the apple in this bowl will actually get eaten. On a
possible, but non-actual, future the apple does not get eaten, but instead remains in
the bowl until it goes rotten. On the view advocated here, the presence of this possible
future is grounded in the “potentiality” that the apple has to rot. The “ground floor”
level of reality has actual objects with “modal profiles,” or sets of potential states that
they could occupy in the appropriate circumstances. It is out of this “furniture” that we
“build” the tree of possibilities. While this is only a sketch, hopefully it does enough
to flesh out somewhat the sort of picture we have in mind. Elaborated theories along
these lines include the works by Barbara Vetter (2015) and Antje Rumberg (2016, the
123
2210 Synthese (2020) 197:2193–2213
second is particularly relevant since it is developed in the framework of branching
model).
Importantly, none of the paraphrases above suggests that beside the concrete acts of
utterances taking place in our world, there are similar acts occurring in other worlds.
For example, the proposition representing E.W. as saying “A” or E.W.’s disposition to
say “A” are radically different entities than E.W.’s actual utterances. Therefore, we do
not need to worry about utterances occurring in other worlds, since, strictly speaking,
no such utterances exist (there exist just appropriate sets of propositions representing
such utterances, dispositions to such utterances, etc.). The postsemantic task was to
match a concrete act of utterance with a particular semantic index and since all the
utterances are made in the single world, all of themwill designate the single actualized
history as the relevant semantic parameter of truth.
The resulting formalmodelmight be seen as a revival of the ideawhich accompanied
Saul Kripke, when he first introduced the semantics for modal logic (Kripke 1959,
1963). In the models he considered, in contrast to what is usually called Kripke-
models today, each structure was equipped with a distinguished world, G, which
Kripke describes as “the real world”. Having done that, he identifies simple truth with
truth-in-the-distinguished-world (Kripke 1963, p. 69).10 By analogy, we define truth
at a context as truth-in-the-distinguished history.
We should mention that Kripke does not distinguish between semantics and post-
semantics, nor does he mention truth at context in his paper. Nonetheless similarities
between his approach and the elitist proposal are remarkable. First of all, Kripke does
distinguish between two notions: truth and truth-in-a-world. The latter is relevant for
all properly semantic purposes (like definitions of logical connectives), while the for-
mer bridges the gap between themore technical and the moremundane notion of truth.
These two are analogous to our notions of truth-at-context and truth-at-index. More-
over, Kripke fixes a single possible world as the unique world relevant for (simple)
truth. Similarly, in the elitist model, a single possible history is fixed as the history
relevant for truth at context. For Kripke, just like for an elitist, to consider an alternative
history as the distinguished history is to construct an entirely new model of the modal
reality. Thus, it is safe to say that Kripke’s “real world” is closely related to our “thin
red line”.
The other way of looking at the assumption that all contexts are actual is more
democratic. An egalitarian doesn’t require a separate model for every possible context.
She accepts that within a single model, an arbitrary moment on the tree can be treated
as a moment of the context. However, even within the liberal perspective, the actualist
presupposition sneaks in. You can consider any possible moment as the moment of
the context, nonetheless, whenever you do so, you need to assume that the possible
moment is also actual. And if it is actual, it is a part of the actual history. Therefore,
one of the possible histories passing through this possible moment needs to be the
actualized history, i.e. the TRL. It is unintelligible to assume that the actualized history
10 A very similar distinction in the context of branching model was entertained by Arthur Prior (1966). For
historical precision, let us mention that Kripke (1959) initially used the term “valid” to describe truth-in-
the-distinguished world. He later replaces “valid” with “true” and admits that “the present terminology is
clearly an improvement.” (Kripke 1963, p. 70)
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is “missing” at a context, since it is to assume that an utterance takes place “outside”
of the world. This egalitarian solution seems to be in line with the view advocated by
Iacona in the mentioned paper:
The crux of the matter is the relation between plain truth, which is a property
that belongs to sentences of natural language (relative to times), and truth in
a history, which is defined in rigorous way for formulas of a formal language
(relative to moments). (…)When a future contingent is uttered at t , the utterance
involves reference to one in particular among the many courses of events that
are possible at t , the actual course of events. (Iacona 2014, pp. 2646–7)
No matter which perspective one takes—elitist or egalitarian11 —it is granted that
every prediction occurs in the actual world. Hence Belnap et al.’s (2001) problem
of predictions made at non-actual contexts does not arise. Importantly, one should
never combine both these perspectives into a single theory. That is, one should never
simultaneously assume that one particular history represents the actual course of events
(elitism), and then consider a possible moment outside of this history as the moment
of the context (egalitarianism).
This type of controversial assumption was implicitly presupposed by many objec-
tions historically raised against the TRL. This might be exemplified by MacFarlane’s
criticism of trl f cn postsemantics (see MacFarlane 2014, sec. 9.4). We will skip the
details, but let us just note that in course of his argument, MacFarlane assumes—in
the elitist manner—that one of the histories is absolutely actual. In the next step, he
envisages however—in the egalitarian fashion—a person who occupies a moment
which lies outside of the actual history. Then, he arrives at a peculiar situation where
a non-actual person is asked to assess a previous, actual utterance. The thought exper-
iment ends rather poorly for the trl f cn postsemantics (it turns out that the non-actual
person needs to admit that what happens to her, was not going to happen). This failure
should serve as a warning against any theory that blends “elitist” and “egalitarian”
points of view. Many of the objections (semantic, metaphysical, and epistemic) that
Belnap et al. (2001) raised against the idea of the Thin Red Line seem to presuppose
a similar, confused version of the TRL theory.12
It is safer then, to stick to either elitism or egalitarianism and always remind oneself
that every moment of the context needs to be treated as a part of the actualized history.
In consequence, one can accept futurism—the simple-minded actualist postsemantics
outlined in Definition 3—which states that a sentence is true, when used at context c if
and only if it is true at the moment of the context (the present moment) and the history
of the context (the actual history). When applied to the issue of future contingents,
the postsemantics implies that the sentence, “There will be a sea battle,” is true at a
given context if and only if there actually will be a sea battle at some later moment.
Not only we believe that it is a consistent postsemantic principle, but we claim that
few theories of future contingents can an offer equally elegant response to the ancient,
Aristotelian puzzle.
11 One could even argue that these two are just different articulations of the same basic idea.
12 A historical reconstruction conducted in (Wawer 2016, sec. 5.1) reveals that some TRLers might have
easily suggested such a metaphysical view to their critics.
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8 Summary
Our aim was to assess the role of the Thin Red Line in the branching setting. We
argued that it is brought in by the actualistic insight to resolve the initialization failure
rendered by Ockhamist semantics. We first considered a semantic version of the Thin
Red Line theory and its criticism championed by Belnap and Green (1994). Then,
we looked into postsemantic answers to the initialization failure and investigated how
they deal with the postsemantic challenge raised by Belnap et al. (2001).We explained
that no semantic objection can be used to discredit these theories, but they generate
controversies since they treat some contexts as non-actual. To rescue the TRL theory,
we reassessed the postsemantic challenge and argued that its force is overstated. We
concluded that as long as one sticks to the actualist modal metaphysics, one need
not be bothered with such an objection. One can simply evauate a sentence used at
a context at the moment of the context and the history of the context. It means that
neither semantics nor postsemantics gives good reasons to give up the Thin Red Line
and bivalence of future contingents that it generates. The overarching lesson of the
argument is that if there is any reason to disqualify the Thin Red Line, it should be
sought for in the domain of metaphysics rather than semantics or postsemantics.
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